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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
  ____________ 
 
No. 16-3237 
____________ 
 
MARK MATTHEWS, 
         Appellant 
 
v. 
 
E.I. DUPONT DE NEMOURS & COMPANY, a Delaware corporation;  
HEWITT ASSOCIATES LLC, an Illinois corporation 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the District of Delaware 
(D.C. No. 1-14-cv-01455) 
District Judge: Honorable Richard G. Andrews 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
March 6, 2017 
 
Before: SMITH, Chief Judge, HARDIMAN, and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed:  March 16, 2017) 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
                                                 
 * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
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HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
Mark Matthews appeals the District Court’s summary judgment in favor of his 
former employer, E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Company, in a case arising under the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act. The District Court held that the decision of 
DuPont’s Plan Administrator to revise Matthews’ pension-benefit calculation was 
entitled to deference under ERISA. Matthews argues that the District Court should have 
reviewed the Administrator’s decision de novo because it was interpreting a state court 
order instead of the Plan. We agree with the parties that the standard of review dictates 
the result in this appeal and because the District Court should have applied de novo 
review, we will reverse.  
I 
 Four undisputed facts set the stage for this dispute. First, Matthews earned a 
pension from DuPont while working there from 1973 to 2013. Second, Matthews married 
his ex-wife in 1973 and divorced in 1993, meaning they were together for about half of 
his tenure at DuPont. Third, Matthews’ divorce decree, entered by the Delaware Family 
Court in 1995, included a Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO) that required 
DuPont to pay a specified portion of Matthews’ pension benefit directly to his ex-wife. 
And fourth, DuPont amended its Plan at the end of 2007, reducing benefits to pensioners 
for post-2007 work by two-thirds.  
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II 
 Although Matthews’ pension benefit determination involved numerous byzantine 
calculations, this appeal turns on one number: the denominator of the “marital fraction.” 
The marital fraction is a ratio that determines the percent of Matthews’ pension to which 
his ex-wife is entitled. Contained in the QDRO, the marital fraction is calculated by 
dividing the “[n]umber of months [Matthews] was in the Plan during the marriage” by the 
total “[n]umber of months [Matthews] was in the Plan.” App. 13. This basic formula, 
which has been approved by the Delaware Supreme Court and is often used in Delaware 
QDROs, is known as the Cooper Formula. See Simms v. Greene-Simms, 22 A.3d 727, 
732 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2009).  
 DuPont altered the basic arithmetic of the Cooper Formula on the heels of its 2007 
Plan amendment, which reduced Matthews’ accrual of future benefits by two-thirds. To 
account for that change, DuPont began crediting each year after 2007 as only one-third of 
a year for marital-fraction purposes. This change “ensure[d] that an employee’s months 
of post-2007 participation are not unfairly weighted given the reduced accrual rate for 
that period.” DuPont Br. 6. Accordingly, Matthews’ final six years of service (from 2008 
to 2013) counted only as two years in his marital fraction, reducing his marital-fraction 
denominator from 487 to 439 months. That change resulted in Matthews’ ex-wife 
receiving an additional $262.11 per month.  
 Matthews challenged this determination through two layers of internal appeals, but 
his claims were denied by the DuPont Benefit Determination Review Team. He then filed 
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this ERISA action in the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware. The District 
Court reasoned that “[w]hat DuPont has done here occurs at the border between 
interpretation of the [QDRO] (to which I owe its decision no deference) and its 
interpretation of the Plan (to which I owe it substantial deference).” Mathews v. E.I. Du 
Pont De Nemours & Co., 2015 WL 8082315, at *2 (D. Del. Dec. 7, 2015).  
After determining that DuPont’s interpretation was “within the umbrella of its 
discretionary decision-making,” the District Court granted summary judgment to DuPont. 
Id. Matthews filed this appeal.  
III1 
Matthews raises two related issues on appeal: (1) whether the District Court erred 
in reviewing DuPont’s determination for abuse of discretion; and (2) whether DuPont’s 
pension determination was correct. As we noted at the outset, the answer to the second 
question is dictated by the way the first question is resolved. 
                                                 
1 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and we 
have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “A district court’s determination of 
the proper standard to apply in its review of an ERISA plan administrator’s decision is a 
legal conclusion which we review de novo.” Viera v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 642 F.3d 
407, 413 (3d Cir. 2011). 
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A 
 Matthews claims DuPont’s determination was based on an interpretation of the 
QDRO, which we would review de novo. See Hullett v. Towers, Perrin, Forster & 
Crosby, Inc., 38 F.3d 107, 114 (3d Cir. 1994). DuPont counters that its determination was 
based on an interpretation of the Plan, which we review to determine whether the 
Administrator’s decision was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. See 
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989); Miller v. Am. Airlines, 
Inc., 632 F.3d 837, 844 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 We agree with Matthews that DuPont was interpreting the QDRO. At the most 
basic level, the dispute is about the meaning of “months [Matthews] was in the Plan” 
(i.e., does “months . . . in the Plan” refer to literal calendar months, or does it have some 
latent meaning that allows for DuPont’s re-weighting?). See App. 13. That provision—
and the entire marital fraction—is found in the QDRO entered by the Delaware state 
court.  
 DuPont’s arguments against this straightforward conclusion fall short. Although 
DuPont asserts somewhat opaquely that it was interpreting the 2007 amendment, it 
neither identifies the Plan provision it claims to be interpreting nor quotes the Plan at all. 
In fact, DuPont indicated throughout the appeal process that it was interpreting the 
QDRO. For example, in a letter to Matthews by the Benefit Determination Review Team, 
DuPont explained that it “interprets the language in a [QDRO] using a marital fraction to 
mean 3/3 of a month for each month prior to January 1, 2008, and 1/3 of a month for each 
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month [thereafter].” App. 531. It also stated that the QDRO “is written in a certain way 
and that based on DuPont’s procedures we will interpret it a certain way.” App. 569.2 
Thus, even had the 2007 amendment factored into DuPont’s determination, it would have 
been as a backdrop for interpreting the language of the QDRO. 
 DuPont next claims it was merely “implementing” the QDRO. DuPont Br. 17. 
While it is true that a QDRO formula is not self-executing and will require some math, 
such implementation does not permit the discretionary alteration of the Cooper Formula 
that DuPont made here. See, e.g., Blue v. UAL Corp., 160 F.3d 383, 386 (7th Cir. 1998) 
(“Administrators are entitled to implement what the forms say. . . . So, too, plans may 
mechanically implement orders from state courts.”); Hullett, 38 F.3d at 114 (explaining 
that the administrator would implement the QDRO “by making an actuarial calculation 
converting the present value of one half of Hullett’s pension”).   
B 
 We turn now to the merits. Matthews argues almost exclusively that DuPont’s 
benefit recalculation cannot withstand de novo review because it is contrary to the terms 
of the QDRO. For its part, DuPont argues exclusively that its determination was not an 
abuse of discretion. As the parties tacitly concede, the result of this appeal is dictated by 
the standard of review.  
                                                 
2 The District Court also framed the issue in such a way that points to the QDRO 
as the object of interpretation, writing that “DuPont’s method of implementing the 
QDRO is truer to what Delaware law intends and requires.” Mathews, 2015 WL 
8082315, at *2. 
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 Having explained why de novo review applies, our analysis begins and ends with 
the text of the QDRO, which states that Matthews’ ex-wife’s benefit should be 
determined by taking the “[n]umber of months [Matthews] was in the Plan during the 
marriage” and dividing by the “[n]umber of months [Matthews] was in the Plan.” App. 
13. There is no indication in the QDRO that “[n]umber of months . . . in the Plan” should 
mean anything other than a tally of the number of months Matthews was a participant in 
the DuPont Plan.  
 The controlling state law supports this straightforward reading.3 “Delaware 
adheres to the ‘objective’ theory of contracts, i.e. a contract’s construction should be that 
which would be understood by an objective, reasonable third party. . . . [Therefore w]hen 
the contract is clear and unambiguous, [Delaware courts] will give effect to the plain-
meaning of the contract’s terms and provisions.” Estate of Osborn ex rel. Osborn v. 
Kemp, 991 A.2d 1153, 1159–60 (Del. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). As the District Court rightly noted, DuPont all but concedes that an objective 
reading of the QDRO supports Matthews’ interpretation. Matthews, 2015 WL 8082315, 
at *2 (“DuPont is essentially conceding that the usual understanding of the formula, as 
stated in the Family Court order, supports Plaintiff’s position.”). 
 Additionally, DuPont’s interpretation subverts the deference owed to state-court 
QDROs by ERISA plan administrators. Our sister circuits have explained that “ERISA 
                                                 
3 Because we are interpreting a Delaware QDRO, we look to Delaware state 
principles of contract interpretation. See Hullett, 38 F.3d at 111 (turning to Pennsylvania 
law to interpret a QDRO governing a relationship in Pennsylvania).  
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does not require, or even permit, a pension fund to look beneath the surface of the order.” 
Brown v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 647 F.3d 221, 227 (5th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted); see 
also Blue, 160 F.3d at 385. Here, the terms of the QDRO support Matthews’ 
interpretation. 
 Finally, we note that DuPont’s alteration to the Cooper Formula was essentially an 
effort to do equity on the heels of its reduction in pension benefits. See DuPont Br. 6 
(explaining that its interpretation “ensures that an employee’s months of post-2007 
participation are not unfairly weighted”). But such equitable considerations are for the 
Delaware courts, not the DuPont Plan Administrator. 4 Specifically, the Cooper Formula 
has a “multiplier” that can account for equitable factors such as increased or decreased 
earnings over time. See Simms, 22 A.3d at 732. If Matthews’ ex-wife believes the QDRO 
has become inequitable, she may seek relief in family court.  
* * * 
For the reasons stated, we will reverse the judgment of the District Court with 
respect to Count I. 
                                                 
4 Even if the Plan Administrator were free to reweigh the equities, it is far from 
clear that DuPont’s decision should be vindicated. As a result of DuPont’s revision, 
Matthews bears the entirety of the decrease in his pension caused by the 2007 
amendment. “[T]he loss in Total Pension Benefit payable with respect to Matthews 
occasioned by the 2007 Amendments is $1,080.98 per month with Matthews suffering a 
loss of $1,081.17 per month while Ms. Matthews has a small gain of $0.19 per month.” 
Matthews Br. 21. The record does not indicate why DuPont determined that its Plan 
participants should bear the brunt of the reduction in benefits while their ex-spouses 
remain unaffected.  
 
